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To understand “managed care,” one needs to understand the traditional 
model of health care organization and ﬁnance that managed care was 
intended to replace. That model was aptly characterized “Guild Free 
Choice” by Charles Weller to indicate that “free choice” was being used 
as a restraint of trade to block the emergence of any form of economic 
competition among doctors (Weller 1983). Its principles were: free choice 
of doctor at all times, free choice of treatment, that is, nobody interferes 
with the doctor’s decisions and recommendations, fee-for-service pay-
ment, direct doctor-patient negotiation of fees, and solo (or small single 
specialty group) practice (Weller 1983). The model was widely accepted 
because of the pre-Wennberg view of most people that “the medical care 
they receive is a necessity, provided by doctors who adhere to scientiﬁc 
norms, based on previously tested and proven treatments” (Wennberg 
1984). In combination with well-insured patients, there was no way that 
employers or insurers could control health spending in this model. Orga-
nized medicine is still ﬁghting to hold on to parts of it.1 Some people say 
that managed care is “anything other than Guild Free Choice.” 
For purposes of this paper, I divide managed care into two types, while 
recognizing that the boundary is not clean. The ﬁrst is the “integrated 
delivery system” (IDS), or “delivery system HMO,” that is, systems that 
are built on the core of a large multi-specialty group practice, often with 
links to hospitals, labs, and pharmacies, and usually with a signiﬁcant 
amount of revenue based on per capita prepayment. Prominent examples 
include Kaiser Permanente, HealthPartners of Minnesota, the former 
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Harvard Community Health Plan, and medical groups such as the Leahy 
and Mayo Clinics. What is important about these systems is that the 
physicians accept accountability for quality and per capita cost, and are 
committed to work together to improve them.
The second category includes what I call “carrier HMOs,” that is, 
entities in which the chassis is an insurance carrier and the providers are 
large numbers of otherwise unafﬁliated doctors, mostly paid on a fee-
for-service basis (Enthoven and Tollen 2004). These carrier HMOs often 
serve as the sole source of health insurance for employers; therefore, in 
order to enable the employer to assure every employee insured access to 
all the doctors he or she might want to see, these HMOs are typically 
very large, often nearly all-inclusive, networks (Robinson 2004). Once 
the providers know that they must be included in the network, the bar-
gaining power of the carriers is weak. Also, such arrangements are usu-
ally only a part of a doctor’s practice, and are unlikely to change practice 
patterns. Such arrangements can be a useful adjunct to an employer’s 
cost containment strategy, and possibly a useful transition device. But 
for purposes of this paper, they are not considered to be very effective 
at care management or cost containment. Indeed, fee for service (FFS) 
points doctors in the direction of resolving all doubts in favor of provid-
ing more, and more costly, services, whether or not more is beneﬁcial to 
the patient. 
From the point of view of the long-run prospects for an economical 
health care system, it makes a world of difference whether or not physi-
cians work in a framework that rewards economical decisions. 
What Happened in the 1990s?
In the 1990s, the market shares of all sorts of managed care increased 
greatly. The shares of these entities are difﬁcult to discern, because   
the data are not reported in terms that I consider signiﬁcant. Surveys 
usually report in the categories of conventional (that is, traditional fee-
for-service indemnity insurance), HMO, PPO, and Point of Service (POS) 
[see the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) and the Health Research and 
Educational Trust (HRET) 2004]. (For the shares of these categories 
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Table 4.1 shows, the market share of conventional insurance plummeted, 
while the combined market shares of HMOs, PPOs, and POS provid-
ers nearly tripled, mostly without much fundamental transformation in 
the underlying delivery system. Most of the HMO members were not 
in integrated delivery systems. On the other hand, the members of the 
American Medical Group Association, which are actual or potential inte-
grated delivery systems, care for more than 50 million patients, some 
through PPOs and POS plans (American Medical Group Association 
2005). Most, but not all, are doing some care management. There are 
468 multi-specialty group practices in the United States with over 100 
physicians (Shortell and Schmittdiel 2004). Under appropriate market 
conditions, most of these could partner with network model HMOs and 
become integrated delivery systems, as many in California have done. 
Victor Fuchs presented the historical health care expenditure (HCE) data 
in a way that illuminates the impact of managed care. Using deﬂated, per 
capita data and three-year moving averages, he showed that health expen-
ditures were growing nearly 6 percent in 1990, while GDP was growing by 
less than 1 percent. Between 1990 and 1995, the growth rate of HCE fell 
to 2 percent, while GDP’s growth rate picked up to 2 percent and more. 
“Both private and public payers demanded restraint of HCE. [These data 
show] that managed care dramatically answered that call” (Fuchs 2000).
The growth rates in health insurance premiums over the 1990s are 
shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Brieﬂy, health insurance premium rates were 
growing in double-digit rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Then the 
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growth rate fell sharply, down to 0.8 percent in 1996, but started rising 
back up to double digits in 2001. HMO premiums generally grew less 
rapidly than conventional insurance and PPO rates. 
When the Clinton health plan collapsed in 1994, employers became 
desperate and herded many of their employees into HMOs without much 
explanation or choice and without visibly sharing the savings. Some 20 
percent of insured employees were assigned to HMOs as a single source 
of health insurance. From 1993 to 1996, HMO market share rose from 
21 percent to 31 percent. Employees were shifted to less costly HMOs, 
and the carrier HMOs took advantage of excess supplies of providers. 
They drove hard bargains on price, and also picked some of the low-
Table 4.2 
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hanging fruit by driving hospital utilization rates down to approximate 
those of the delivery system HMOs.
Driving employees into HMOs without a choice was a most unwise 
policy. It is not surprising that it produced the managed-care backlash, 
that is, strong expressions of dissatisfaction and complaint by some con-
sumers and patients (actually a minority) who felt that their access to 
care had been restricted by managed care, and by some (but not all) 
physicians who felt that managed care had limited their autonomy (and 
cut their fees). All these sentiments were expressed energetically to poli-
ticians, who felt pressure to respond, often with legislation restricting 
managed care. The media smelled blood in the water, fabricated some 
horror stories, exaggerated isolated incidents, and added to the general 
dissatisfaction (Blendon et al. 1998). 
Research showed that dissatisfaction was concentrated among people 
who had no choice (Davis and Schoen 1998; Gawande et al. 1998; and 
Enthoven, Schaufﬂer, and McMenamin 2001). This should not be sur-
prising. People want to be able to choose their own doctors; therefore, in 
a world of selective managed care, they must be allowed to choose their 
managed care. The problem was, and is, that this conﬂicts with employer 
and insurer preferences for the single-source model. Further evidence that 
lack of choice was the key factor is that employers such as Stanford and 
those afﬁliated with CalPERS, most of whose employees were in HMOs 
by choice, experienced no backlash. A recent article reported that the 
backlash was not followed by a mass exodus from HMOs (Marquis, 
Rogowski, and Escarce 2005).
One of the ironies was that surveys found that in California about 10 
percent of members were actually dissatisﬁed with their managed care 
(The California Managed Health Care Improvement Task Force 1998). 
Of course, even 1 percent of Californians still represents over 300,000 
people. What should have happened is that employers should have told 
their employees, “We can no longer afford to pay the full costs of your 
traditional fee-for-service insurance and still raise your pay; so we will 
continue to offer it, but we will pay only up to the costs of the HMO, and 
then let you make the choice.”
The backlash led to weakened managed care. Restrictions on managed 
care triggered a “feeding frenzy” among state legislators, who passed 
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laws against “drive-through babies” in the absence of any evidence 
that the policy of 24-hour maternity stays (with exceptions for cases of 
medical need) were harmful to anyone’s health. In addition, some states 
passed “any willing provider laws” that destroy the bargaining power of 
managed care and prevent it from trading volume for price (Caroll and 
Ambrose 2002; Martinez 2002). Perhaps worse, however, the backlash 
led employers to reinvent “any willing provider” on their own, by insist-
ing on very wide, all-inclusive networks to ensure that each employee 
could ﬁnd his or her favorite doctors in the network. In most cases, this 
took the form of the wide-access PPO, a model incapable of really man-
aging health expenditures. 
Managed Care and Managed Competition Did Not Happen
One important thing that did not happen in the 1990s was managed com-
petition on a large scale (Enthoven 1993). The employers of 77 percent 
of employed, insured Americans did not offer their employees a choice of 
carrier (Marquis and Long 1999). (Offerings of two or more plan designs 
from the same carrier, with each design offering mostly or entirely the 
same providers, is not managed competition.) Of the employers that do 
offer a choice, most contributed more on behalf of the employees who 
chose costlier health insurance programs (KFF and HRET 2004). These 
employers subsidize inefﬁciency, and tax efﬁciency. A frequent pattern is 
for the employer to pay a ﬁxed percentage, such as 80 to 100 percent of 
the premium of the employee’s plan of choice. Such policies originated 
in the open-ended tax break for employer-provided health insurance and 
union demands, and may persist if they are seen as a crude form of risk 
adjustment. These policies deny managed care the opportunity to market 
its superior efﬁciency. The survey evidence points to the fact that fewer 
than 10 percent of workers at Fortune 500 companies have a choice of 
health insurance program and receive from their employer a ﬁxed-dollar 
contribution (risk-adjusted or not), allowing them to keep the savings 
(Maxwell and Temin 2002). This combination is a minimal condition for 
the success of effective managed care.
It is a great irony that, contrary to the widespread belief that we have 
a market-oriented health system—a belief reﬂected in the announcement 
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aged care. In most places, the market available for competing integrated 
delivery systems is just too small. So the answer to the brochure’s ques-
tion: “How has the U.S. health care system adjusted to the introduction 
of market-oriented medicine?” is that, for the most part, we have not 
introduced a market for effective managed care. 
Someone might object that we see a great deal of “competition” 
among managed care organizations seeking to contract with employers. 
The problem is that this is a crippled competition. Effective managed 
care must select providers. But such selective managed care cannot (or 
should not attempt to) serve as a single source of care for an employ-
ment group because people want to be able to choose their own doctor, 
and many people will have good reasons for not wanting to belong to 
any particular delivery system HMO, or any HMO at all. Their reasons 
may include that they do not see their favorite doctors there, the facilities 
are not conveniently located, they do not like the institutional style, or 
they do not trust the incentives in risk-adjusted per capita prepayment. 
Since the choice of a managed care organization must be at the individual 
employee level, an effective market must be based on responsible choice 
at the employee level.
A local example of the effects of faulty market structure is the experi-
ence of Harvard Community Health Plan, a highly regarded “ﬂagship” 
of the prepaid group practice movement. In the decades from its early 
1970s startup to the mid-1980s, its membership grew very rapidly. Then 
in the mid-1980s, it hit a “glass ceiling” and growth practically stopped. 
I interpret that to be the result of the fact that they got as much mar-
ket share as they could from the choice-offering employers, and most 
employment groups were not available to them.
Creating a Competitive Market
How might we create a truly competitive market in which effective 
managed care can compete to serve everyone? I have written about the 
possibilities, essentially building on limited but demonstrated practical 
successes. As one example, some large employers offer their employees 
several choices and a ﬁxed-dollar contribution toward the plan of their 
choice: the University of California, Stanford, Harvard,3 Wells Fargo 
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Bank, Hewlett-Packard, and the State of California. At Stanford last year, 
the university saved $44 million compared with what it would have cost 
if everyone had been in the PPO (Enthoven and Talbott 2004). Many 
others could convert to a market model simply by changing their ﬁxed-
percent-of-premium contribution to a risk-adjusted, ﬁxed-dollar amount. 
But that would still leave out three-quarters of insured employees. 
Another possibility is exchanges. For example, in California, the pro-
gram that brokers care for state employees, CalPERS, was opened to 
local government agencies, and more than 1,000 belong. So, a Califor-
nia state agency is running an exchange for more than 1,000 employers. 
Employees are offered a multiple choice, including HMOs and PPOs. At 
least at last report, state employees received ﬁxed-dollar contributions 
(alas, not risk-adjusted), below the price of the low-priced plan, toward 
the purchase of health insurance. (Some local agencies contribute more 
on behalf of costlier plans, so the whole of CalPERS is not a pure model 
of managed competition.) In California, we also have PacAdvantage, a 
nonproﬁt exchange for small employers, and California Choice, a model 
created and run by brokers for small employers that offers employees a 
choice from among six or eight delivery systems. California Choice is 
growing and now covers about 165,000 lives. (Unfortunately, employers 
are not required to offer ﬁxed-dollar contributions in these exchanges.)
Another approach to exchanges is offered by BENU, a new company 
that offers employers the simplicity of a single source, while employ-
ees have a choice of two carriers and several plan designs (Closs 2004). 
BENU uses software to achieve administrative simplicity, and state-of-
the-art risk adjustment to deal with biased selection. BENU has con-
tracted with Kaiser Permanente and CIGNA in Portland, Oregon, and 
Washington, D.C., to be offered through their model.4 The carriers have 
agreed on the risk-adjustment model for post-enrollment allocation of 
premium revenues. Because the carriers are protected from adverse selec-
tion, employers can use a ﬁxed-dollar contribution strategy. 
I see no compelling or fundamental reason why the private sector can-
not create exchanges of their own, to parallel CalPERS. There are signiﬁ-
cant barriers, such as the need for upfront investment; for employers to 
understand and be persuaded of the beneﬁts of competition; for a willing-
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groups instead of designs particularized to each group; and for a long-
term solution to appeal to a very short-term-oriented community. Perhaps 
this would be too much of a public good to expect private employers to 
fund the startup. However, software does exist to make risk-adjusted 
payments to each health plan and to require risk-adjusted contributions 
from each employer, so that employers would not have to subsidize one 
another in the exchange. 
A legitimate and serious concern is that there will be adverse selection 
in a multiple-plan offering, leading to death spirals, to signiﬁcant proﬁts 
and losses that are attributable to risk selection rather than to quality and 
efﬁciency, and to such outcomes as failure to develop expertise in treat-
ment of costly chronic conditions. Managed competition theory rests on 
the expectation that predictive modeling tools can be developed that will 
permit risk adjustment of premiums, enabling employees to see risk-neu-
tral premiums and health plans to be rewarded for caring for bad risks. 
This is a very complex issue; this is not the time or place to review it.5 
There are commercially available models that address it.6 A recent study 
sponsored by the Society of Actuaries found that some of these models 
get an R-squared fairly close to the 20 percent that Newhouse requires 
of an ideal risk adjuster.7 There will be inefﬁciencies from imperfect risk 
adjustments. The judgment on which all of this rests is whether or not the 
efﬁciency gains that result from competing integrated delivery systems 
are likely to be greater than the inefﬁciencies induced by imperfection in 
risk adjustment, or in any other payment system we might adopt. 
Large regional exchanges could offer many advantages: people could 
retain membership in the HMO of their choice as they switched from one 
job to another—reducing wasteful turnover; large parts of the market 
could be opened up to real competition; and economies of scale could 
be great. The costs of administration in CalPERS are less than one-half 
of 1 percent of premium because they cover 1.3 million people. And car-
rier administration costs are also low: Kaiser Permanente signs one con-
tract to cover some 400,000 people. A large regional exchange could 
accomplish risk adjustment, reinsure very-high-cost cases, and manage 
COBRA continuity for employers. And government could create sub-
sidized groups (for example, poor people) and buy their way into the 
exchange. Also, such exchanges could greatly reduce the costs of market 
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entry for new managed care organizations. Without exchanges, a new 
HMO today faces a formidable barrier to entry, that is, the need to make 
a sale to and contract with hundreds of thousands of employers. A large 
regional exchange could cut though this. In fact, CalPERS played a major 
role in easing market entry for many HMOs in California in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The existing market entry barriers are another important rea-
son why we cannot say that we have a functioning market for managed 
care in this country.
Did Managed Care Work as Expected?
Did managed care work as its advocates expected? Not as I expected. 
My ﬁrst proposal for managed competition was for universal coverage 
in which government would pay a risk-adjusted amount set at the low-
priced plan for everybody, the tax exclusion for employer-paid health 
insurance would be repealed, managed care would compete on a level 
playing ﬁeld, and every person would have to make a responsible, cost-
conscious choice (Enthoven 1978). I developed this proposal as a consul-
tant to Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Joe Califano 
and the Carter administration, in response to Jimmy Carter’s campaign 
promise to bring us universal health insurance. 
Subsequently, I expected that the advantages of managed competition 
would become apparent to private-sector employers who were complain-
ing that health expenditures were running out of control, and who, for a 
time, seemed to be embracing HMOs. I did not anticipate the scope and 
extent of employer unwillingness or the inability to create a competitive 
market at the employee level.
The Employment-Based System Is Failing
It is now apparent that the employment basis of health insurance is hope-
lessly ﬂawed (Enthoven 1979). There are too many reasons why employ-
ers are incapable of being good sponsors of health insurance, although 
I do recognize the small minority who do a good job. For most, the rea-
sons include their lack of understanding of health insurance and health 
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orientation in the face of problems that need long-term solutions, and 
their use of health insurance to further company (or union) goals, rather 
than to contribute to a rational and equitable overall health care system. 
Problems follow from the fact that some managed care companies see 
the employer, rather than the employee, as their customer. In the employ-
ment-based system, market forces work to undermine cross-subsidies of 
the costly patients. High deductibles are a step in that direction. Employ-
ers can outsource services provided by low-wage people (for example, 
janitors) to companies that do not provide health insurance. 
The need for health insurance companies to deal with millions of 
employers and individuals creates market entry barriers and adds to 
administrative costs. The employer-based model has left out 45 million 
people under the age of 65, and the ﬁnancing is regressive. This is becom-
ing a very serious problem as the costs of health insurance become large 
relative to the earning power of many workers. People typically lose their 
health insurance when they lose their jobs (mitigated by COBRA, but 
still a problem)—just when they need it most, and are quite likely to have 
a difﬁcult time paying for it—or when the breadwinner dies or becomes 
unable to work. Others lose their health insurance (Medicaid) when they 
get a job, creating a work disincentive and a very high implicit marginal 
income tax rate. Some people are locked into jobs that do not repre-
sent the best use of their talents, “job lock”; others become trapped in 
unsatisfactory marriages because they depend on their spouse for health 
insurance, “wed lock.” Many are forced to change their HMO when they 
change jobs, which may mean changing their doctors, or to make a new 
start on their annual deductibles. Many people simply do not ﬁt into the 
employment model: pre-Medicare widows, many of whom are not poor, 
but who may become so as a result of medical costs (Himmelstein et al. 
2005); the self-employed, including professionals and domestic helpers; 
and entrepreneurs starting new companies.
Implications for Reform
We need reform that replaces the employer-based model, which is failing 
(Enthoven 2003), with universal coverage based on managed competition 
in the private sector (Enthoven 1978). Ezekiel Emanuel and Victor Fuchs 
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recently pointed the way with publicly ﬁnanced risk-adjusted vouchers 
for everyone (Emanuel and Fuchs 2005). Every person should have a 
wide choice,8 a responsible choice,9 an individual (or family) choice, an 
informed choice, and multiple choice where possible. Short of such uni-
versal coverage, we could approach a universal competitive market or 
transition to market-based universal coverage by creating large regional 
exchanges and encouraging the majority of employers (possibly with tax 
incentives), particularly small ﬁrms, to buy coverage for their employ-
ees through these exchanges. Compared with conventional insurance 
and wide-network PPOs, IDS HMOs do very well in such environments, 
even under present tax laws that subsidize employee choice of costlier 
coverage. For example, 75 percent of Stanford employees are in such 
HMOs; 78 percent of Wells Fargo California employees and 80 percent 
of University of California employees have chosen HMOs that are mostly 
“California delegated models,” based on multi-specialty group practices 
and individual practice associations. It matters little if some 20 percent 
want the costlier care that goes with PPOs if the extra cost is paid by the 
employee, and not by his or her employer or by taxpayers. In fact it is a 
good thing that non-HMOs exist. Nobody should be in an HMO against 
his or her will. 
What could we expect to happen if we had a model of universal (man-
aged) competition to serve cost-conscious consumers? All I can offer 
is speculation, because this would be a radically different environment 
from today’s.
The most important players on the ﬁeld, at ﬁrst, would be wide-net-
work PPOs and integrated-delivery-system HMOs. However, we can 
be sure that a host of innovative models somewhere in between would 
emerge. Particularly, there would be selective network models created 
by insurance companies. There is little that wide-access PPOs can do to 
control cost. They can’t select providers; they can’t do much to inﬂuence 
care patterns; and they would have little inﬂuence on the deployment of 
new technologies. If and when they tried to negotiate lower fees, they 
would learn what CMS (the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) knows about 
fee-for-service Medicare: that a fee cut intended to save $100 would be 
followed by increased utilization that would take back $30. As a result, 109 Alain C. Enthoven
we would see doctors running around faster and providing more services 
to protect their incomes (Volume-and-Intensity Response Team 1998). 
Knowing that the doctor visit is very compressible, we would see a great 
number of very short follow-up visits.
On the other hand, there is a long list of actions that IDS could take, in 
response to long-term competitive pressures, that could reduce cost and 
expenditure and improve care.
To begin with, in the Health Insurance Experiment, RAND found that 
the Group Health Cooperative (GHC) provided high-quality care while 
generating 28 percent fewer relative value units than the fee-for-service 
sector in Seattle (Newhouse 1993). This does not give them credit for 
lowering total cost by better personnel utilization, or by more effective 
purchasing, as such an organization could do, relative to the performance 
of the fragmented fee-for-service sector. I think the importance of this 
result is that it was produced in the absence of cost-conscious customers 
(Seattle was a union town) and competition in kind.10 Here is a list of 12 
actions that IDS could take to improve quality and cut cost:
(1)  Emphasize primary care, disease prevention, and early detection and 
treatment, practices that would generate positive externalities for our 
whole society.
(2) Create or share in institutions like Minnesota’s Institute for Clini-
cal Systems Improvement, Kaiser Permanente’s Care Management Insti-
tute, and the Veterans Health Administration’s Quality Enhancement 
Research Initiative that form physician teams to translate science into 
up-to-date clinical practice guidelines (Committee on Quality of Health 
Care in America 2001). 
(3) Carefully select and train physicians and other health professionals 
for quality and willingness to work in teams. Have programs to ensure 
that they are proﬁcient, well informed, and up-to-date. Train nonphysi-
cian personnel to maximize the services that they can perform appro-
priately, reserving physicians for where they are needed. Deploy health 
professionals in the appropriate numbers and specialties needed to care 
for enrolled populations. [Prepaid group practices use physicians and 
nonphysician professionals more efﬁciently than does health care in gen-
eral (Weiner 2004).] Pay physicians both salaries and bonuses based on 
measured patient satisfaction, indicators of productivity, quality, and 
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teamwork, in order to align provider incentives with the interests of 
patients in high-quality, affordable health care.
(4) Deploy health information technology (HIT). Use it for electronic 
medical records, with diagnostic test results and procedures recorded and 
conveniently available for all doctors, so that they have a complete pic-
ture of the patient’s medical history before seeing the patient. Also, use 
IT to create convenient caregiver support tools, such as reminders, alerts, 
and summaries of relevant guidelines, so that the value of each encounter 
can be maximized (Halvorson 2004). McGlynn et al. recently published 
an important study documenting that Americans are receiving barely half 
of recommended care. Errors of omission are widespread (McGlynn et 
al. 2003); this could be ameliorated greatly by computerized caregiver 
support tools. 
(5) Continually evaluate and redesign work processes to improve efﬁ-
ciency and take full advantage of IT. It is worth noting that the IDS prac-
tices are far ahead of the solo-practice sector in the deployment of HIT 
(Shortell and Schmittdiel 2004). It will be far more difﬁcult for solo doc-
tors to have comprehensive patient records. Information technology is 
the nervous system; to realize its potential, there needs to be a “brain,” 
that is, a person or a team to regularly review and analyze the infor-
mation and then feed the results back into practice improvement. Solo 
doctors are having a difﬁcult time deploying HIT because they have not 
generated the capital to do so, and they lack a business case for it because 
they do not share in responsibility for total system cost and quality. 
(6) Select and deploy equipment that has been evaluated for safety and 
effectiveness, in appropriate numbers for proﬁciency and economies of 
scale. Create training programs to be sure personnel are well trained in 
its use. 
(7) Concentrate complex procedures in regional centers of excellence. 
Delivery systems may either create their own centers or subcontract the 
work to centers outside their systems, based on rational “make-buy” cal-
culations.
(8) Back away from “ﬂat-of-the-curve” medicine, that is, practices in 
which the marginal beneﬁt in health outcomes is very small relative to 
the cost. There can be little doubt that today there is a great deal of “ﬂat-
of-the-curve” medicine, such as the large numbers of specialist visits of 
patients in the last months of their lives, as documented by Wennberg in 
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(9) In general, IDS practices can, and do, practice “Continuous Qual-
ity Improvement” (Berwick and Jain 2004) to review and redesign care 
processes and to innovate with better practices (Enthoven and Keston 
1998). Donald Berwick and Sachin Jain have written: “Prepaid Group 
Practices (PGPs) have the potential to deliver greater health care quality 
than is provided in the more prevalent, disaggregated, fee-for-service care 
system” (Berwick and Jain 2004). 
(10) Integrate services through the continuum of care—at home, at the 
doctor’s ofﬁce, and in the hospital inpatient and outpatient settings. 
Deliver care in the least costly, appropriate setting, taking into account 
total system costs, not just costs and revenues associated with one set-
ting. IDS practices can engage in such planning in a way that is impos-
sible for disaggregated providers. Also in the IDS sector, resources can 
be transferred smoothly from one setting to another within the system’s 
total budget. Some IDS practices own hospitals, while others develop 
close contractual relationships with hospitals. An important source of 
efﬁciency gain is the alignment of physician and hospital incentives, all 
oriented to the best total result.
(11) Improve care management for chronic disease; train and deploy 
teams of nonphysicians for this work. In the fee-for-service sector, insur-
ers are now contracting with disease management companies that work 
separately from doctors. Integration of disease management into the 
whole medical care program must offer opportunities for greater efﬁ-
ciency as well as improved alignment of incentives.
(12) IDS practices can evaluate new technologies and use them only 
where beneﬁcial to patients, and not otherwise. [For example, Kaiser 
Permanente has saved millions of dollars by using Cox-2 inhibitors and 
low osmolality contrast agents only where needed (Crosson 2005 and 
Eddy 1996).] Efﬁciently deploy new technologies to assure proﬁcient use. 
IDS practices can deploy cost-saving technologies faster than the tradi-
tional sector, despite the fact that such technology use would not be in 
the economic interest of fee-for-service solo-practice doctors.12 In gen-
eral, salaried doctors have far less incentive than fee-for-service doctors 
to demand technology deployment to further their own economic inter-
ests. Genomics offers exciting opportunities for better care and also large 
challenges to the health care system. There are hundreds of genetic tests 
now available, some quite costly. Genomics offers opportunities to diag-
nose people at high risk for disease and to develop targeted therapies. To 
use these resources wisely and effectively, there will be need for organized 
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systematic approaches, including evaluation of who should be tested and 
what prevention strategies and therapies they should be offered. Thus, 
there will be a great need to educate and inform physicians and genetic 
counselors. The Kaiser Permanente Northern California Region genet-
ics program already has more than 250 employees and performs more 
than 20,000 genetic tests a year (Arp 2005). It is difﬁcult to see how the 
fragmented solo-practice sector will be able to deal effectively with this 
situation. 
The total economic environment would contrast sharply with what 
exists in American health care today. Today’s health care economy rests 
on inﬂationary incentives, dominated by the cost-increasing incentives of 
FFS, the tax code, employers who subsidize more and costlier care, and 
barriers to market entry by efﬁcient alternatives. In the model that I am 
describing, market entry for innovative, cost-effective, organized systems 
would be eased greatly, and everybody would be in a model of cost-con-
scious choice. The general standards of care would move in the direction 
of greater consideration of marginal cost versus beneﬁt. The environment 
would legitimize cost-conscious medicine. Most people would no longer 
see cost reduction as unworthy, because it would be in their obvious per-
sonal interest. We could expect to see a large cultural change.
In its effort to moderate expenditure growth, this truly competitive 
market would be up against the relentless force of expanding medical 
technology. National health expenditures are rising because more and 
more people want and receive the beneﬁts of costly technologies such 
as joint replacements and invasive cardiology (Fuchs 1999). And now, 
very costly drugs are emerging to correct enzyme deﬁciencies and to ﬁght 
cancer. A New York Times article recently reported that Genentech’s new 
drug, Avastin, would be priced at $8,800 per month; and for that, so far, 
it offers life extension of only a few months for some patients (Berenson 
2006). Also, the beneﬁts of competition will be attenuated by provider 
monopolies in many areas, and a vigorous anti-trust program will be 
needed.
But I also think that it is not unreasonable to believe that national 
health expenditures in a truly competitive market of the kind I have 
described would be half what they will be if we stay with the present 
system, a nontrivial difference. We cannot stay with the present system 113 Alain C. Enthoven
much longer. Fundamental reform of some kind will happen. And it is 
reasonable to think that the reform most compatible with American cul-
ture would be a decentralized, competitive market model. 
Notes
1.  “Any willing provider” laws, for example.
2. Wanting It All: The Challenge of Reforming the U.S. Health Care System, 
June 15–17, 2005, Wequassett Inn, Chatham, MA. The announcement for this 
session says, “How has the U.S. health care system adjusted to the introduction 
of market-oriented medicine?”
3. Harvard converted from employer payment of 85 percent of the premium of 
the employee’s plan of choice to a ﬁxed-dollar amount set below the price of the 
low-priced plan in 1995, without any risk adjustment. This put the Blue Cross 
Blue Shield PPO into a death spiral, and it was withdrawn in three years (Cutler 
and Reber 1998). Other managers of health plan competition have mitigated or 
prevented death spirals by plan design (for example, by raising the deductible). 
The Health Insurance Plan of California rescued its PPO by using diagnosis-based 
risk adjustment (see Shewry et al. 1996). Recently, practical, diagnosis-based risk 
adjustment has become available.
4. They also offer a combination of Group Health Cooperative and CIGNA in 
Seattle.
5.  For what is probably the best analysis in depth, see Newhouse (2002).
6.  The list includes Diagnostic Cost Groups from Boston University, Ambulatory 
Care Groups from Johns Hopkins University, and Episode Groupers produced 
by Symmetry.
7. See  Newhouse (2002, p. 151). The actuaries’ results are for cases truncated at 
$100,000. Dealing with very-high-cost cases is complex if one wants to maintain 
appropriate incentives to manage those cases efﬁciently and to keep people out of 
that category. See Cumming et al. (2002).
8. That is, not just IDS HMOs, but also PPOs, POS, or indemnity plans, if 
enough people want them.
9.  That is, if one wants a plan that costs more than the base plan, one must pay 
the full difference with one’s net after-tax dollars.
10. GHC ran into the same glass ceiling of non-choice-offering employers that 
HCHP ran into in Boston: like HCHP, they had to establish an individual-prac-
tice network to be able to compete for single-source business. In the process, they 
lost their cost advantage.
11. David Eddy (1996) documented an example in which Kaiser Permanente, 
in Southern California, developed guidelines to identify patients who really 
needed low osmolality contrast agents, so that they could stop using them on 
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most patients who did not need them. A similar process took place for Cox-2 
inhibitors. Kaiser Permanente used them sparingly and also followed the Cox-2 
patients. 
12.  An example of such a technology is uterine artery embolization (UAE), which 
costs less and is less invasive than hysterectomy and works well for many women. 
OBGYNs do not tell their patients about it as an alternative to hysterectomy, 
perhaps because it is done by interventional radiologists (see Helliker and Etter 
2004).
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action. Health Affairs 3 (2): 6–32.Comments on Enthoven’s “The U.S.  
Experience with Managed Care and  
Managed Competition”
Michael E. Chernew
The consensus among policymakers, business leaders, employees, and 
virtually anyone who has thought seriously about the issue is that the 
American system of ﬁnancing health care suffers from serious deﬁcien-
cies. Costs are high and growing, many Americans lack insurance cover-
age, and there is a pervasive sense that there are serious inefﬁciencies and 
quality deﬁciencies associated with the delivery of care.
The paper by Dr. Enthoven provides insight into these issues and 
traces the rise (sort of) and fall (sort of) of one proposed approach to 
improve the situation: increased competition in health care. I caveat the 
“rise” and “fall” with “sort of” because the system of managed care and 
competition that arose during much of the 1990s did not conform par-
ticularly closely to the system advocated by Dr. Enthoven, and therefore 
it is a bit unfair to assert that this system was tried and has failed. In any 
case, the premise behind Enthovenian competition is that consumers are 
not able to make appropriate economic decisions at the point of service 
because they do not have the necessary information, and because insur-
ance distorts the incentives they face by reducing the price they must pay 
for care. To remedy this, competition is pushed to the point of health 
plan choice. Consumers choose health plans that, in turn, inﬂuence the 
care they receive (and the prices they pay for that care). 
This competitive solution is not new. In fact, Dr. Enthoven has been 
associated with this approach for decades. So why has this system not 
come to pass? Dr. Enthoven focuses on the failure of employers to pro-
vide employees with the appropriate ﬁnancial incentives at the time of 
health plan purchase, a situation that is exacerbated by the tax code, 
which subsidizes coverage and reduces the incremental costs of more 
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expensive plans. I agree with the fundamental premise of his work: the 
system would be better off if employees had a broad choice of plans and 
faced the incremental costs associated with more expensive plans.
Yet Dr. Enthoven believes (or, more accurately, I believe he believes) 
that, in such a system, the entities that would “win” in the marketplace 
are “delivery-system HMOs,” which rely on relatively exclusive provider 
networks to organize and deliver care. 
In the current system, many HMOs are “carrier HMOs” that have 
broad physician networks and less ability to manage care. Dr. Enthoven 
would likely trace these carrier HMOs and broad networks to the muted 
ﬁnancial incentives put in place by employers. Yet I think that we cannot 
be so quick to dismiss the possibility that consumer demand for broad 
networks is high. What they will pay for this breadth is not really known, 
but clearly consumers seem to desire this breadth. 
Breadth of networks offers three main beneﬁts. First, it allows consum-
ers to delay their choice of physician, particularly for specialist care, until 
they need a specialist. They may not want to commit at the time of health 
plan purchase because their preferences for physicians are unknown to 
them before they become ill. Second, closed networks require individuals 
to choose physicians from the system they selected for all types of care 
that they may need. They may prefer physicians in one delivery system 
for one type of care and physicians in another system for another type of 
care, and broad networks reduce the chances that their preferred physi-
cians will be out of network. Third, in many markets, travel times might 
have to increase dramatically if providers were exclusively in one system. 
The density of many markets might not support competing delivery sys-
tem HMOs.
Of course, the complaints about “carrier” HMOs and broad networks 
are not tremendously damning for a model of managed competition. 
Plans can and do have provisions for allowing out-of-network care, and 
much of the care delivered currently is in-network; so the demand for 
broad networks may not reﬂect a strong desire to see out-of-network 
physicians, but rather a demand to have the option to do so. 
Moreover, in a dynamic setting it is not clear that premiums would 
be lower in a system of competing delivery-system HMOs relative to a 121 Michael E. Chernew
system of competing broad-network plans, even if the delivery system 
HMOs enjoyed a cost advantage. Although competing delivery system 
HMOs with relatively distinct provider networks would have a strong 
incentive to compete in a static model, the extent to which such a system 
would enhance competition in a dynamic model is unclear. Consumers 
are hesitant to switch physicians. Distinct physician networks could yield 
a system in which the elasticity of demand facing any given plan could be 
low because of this inertia. The system could resemble markets for dura-
ble goods in which there is extensive competition for the initial sale, but 
little competition for post-sale parts or service. The extent to which this 
inertia would result in higher premiums would depend on the willingness 
of consumers to switch physicians. With exclusive provider networks and 
meaningful travel costs, in some settings local monopolies may arise, fur-
ther contributing to reduced competition among plans. 
Ultimately, the premium differential between a system of competing 
delivery-system HMOs and one of competing carrier HMOs (or any other 
type of broad-network plans, for that matter) will depend on the cost 
advantages of an exclusive network of providers relative to any increase 
in premiums associated with inelastic demand facing closed systems. In 
any case, if the ﬁnancial incentives were correct at the time of purchase, 
we might not be discouraged if broad-network plans “won,” because 
the premium advantages may not be as great as the cost advantages, and 
because such an outcome could be interpreted as reﬂecting consumers’ 
preferences regarding their care systems. With heterogeneous tastes, we 
might expect a range of plan types to survive, and more analysis is needed 
to understand better how the different systems affect one another and 
the market overall. Offering appropriate ﬁnancial incentives at the time 
of plan purchase does not guarantee that there will be no inefﬁciencies in 
the functioning of the plans or the system overall.
Two other aspects of a managed competition model are worth men-
tioning. First, it is unlikely that a managed competition model, even if 
it worked as Dr. Enthoven envisions, would eliminate health care cost 
growth. Imagine the outcome from a competitive health care system if 
the main goal were the optimal delivery of care. Most observers would 
agree that such a system would be less expensive at any point in time 
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than the current system that contains incentives for excess consumption 
(although there is also evidence of underconsumption of certain services 
with the current system). 
However, the optimal amount of health care spending rises over time 
as medical technology progresses; so even if we achieve optimal spending, 
we can still expect cost growth. This is depicted in Figure 4.1. Optimal 
care at time t is bundle A, and optimal care at time t+1 is bundle B. Inef-
ﬁcient care at time t is bundle C, and inefﬁcient care at time t+1 is bundle 
D. Cost growth in an inefﬁcient system is represented by movement from 
C to D. Cost growth in an optimal system is represented by movement 
from bundle A to bundle B. Which cost growth will be greater depends 
on the manner in which technology shifts demand. Movement from an 
inefﬁcient system to an optimal one is represented by cost savings (move-
ment from C to A), followed by cost growth (movement to B).
Of course, cost growth in an optimal system (from A to B) should 
be viewed favorably because, by the deﬁnition of optimal spending, the 
beneﬁts would justify the expenditures. Yet policymakers and purchasers 
should not expect cost growth to disappear. Whether or not cost growth 
slows will depend on how medical technology progresses. While it is cer-
tainly true that a system of more-conservative health plans would encour-
Figure 4.1
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age medical innovations that are less cost increasing, evidence about how 
the nature of technological progress would change in a managed compe-
tition system is scant. 
For this reason, although the savings associated with a more efﬁcient 
system may represent a downward shift in health spending, it may not 
alter the trajectory of health care spending over time. This is depicted in 
Figure 4.2. The trajectory of spending in an inefﬁcient system is higher 
than that in an efﬁcient system, but the slopes are not necessarily dif-
ferent. The rates of spending growth could be similar in both settings. 
Because we have not experienced an optimal system of care, we cannot 
assess easily the spending trajectory that we would experience in such a 
system. Existing evidence suggests that the introduction of managed care 
has reduced spending and lowered the rate of spending growth, but the 
reductions in spending growth have not been sufﬁcient to stem the ris-
ing share of GDP devoted to health care (see Chernew et al. 1998 for a 
review).
Second, as we introduce a greater level of competition into health care 
markets, we may achieve greater efﬁciency. It is reasonable to expect more 
explicit tiers of care, with some individuals paying for plans with fewer 
restrictions on care (and maybe better outcomes), and other individu-
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als enrolling in plans with less access to certain services. Such a system 
might not be worse than our current system, which exhibits considerable 
inequality in access, and evidence that the variance in costs is associated 
with meaningful variation in quality is not strong. Even if current varia-
tion in costs is related to inefﬁciencies, so that less expensive plans are 
not inferior, we should expect the possibility that as technology advances 
and costs grow, variance in costs will increasingly be related to quality 
differences. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3. When the system is inefﬁ-
cient (at bundle A), consumers could get more health and more of every-
thing else if the inefﬁciency were eliminated by moving to a bundle on 
the production possibility frontier (such as bundle B). However, once 
on the production possibility frontier at bundle B, the only way to get 
more health is to give up some nonhealth consumption, by moving to 
another point of the production possibility frontier, such as bundle C. 
Thus, in an efﬁcient system, the tradeoffs between health and nonhealth 
goods will be more salient, and different individuals will make different 
choices. Those choices will be based in part on preferences, and in part 
on income. Concerns about tiers of care that might arise by income group 
could be addressed with income subsidies or vouchers, but this raises a 
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There are several takeaway messages from this discussion. First, a sys-
tem of competing delivery system HMOs, even if working as Dr. Enthoven 
envisions, would still be characterized by cost growth and tiered levels of 
care. From an economic perspective, these may not be suboptimal out-
comes, but they will likely be important aspects of the system that policy-
makers will need to address. Second, a richer understanding of why such a 
system has been slow to take off is needed. If imperfect risk adjustment is 
part of the explanation, more work is needed to improve risk adjustment 
methods. Similarly, if information imperfections are part of the explana-
tion, additional research regarding information needs and dissemination 
approaches is particularly important. In this regard, I should note that 
Dr. Enthoven has been a strong advocate for informing consumers about 
the “quality” of care delivered in different systems. 
Third, considerable uncertainty exists regarding the outcomes that 
would arise from a system of Enthovenian competition. I think it is likely 
that multiple types of plans would arise, and greater understanding is 
needed regarding how they might both impact and compete against one 
another. This requires more thorough knowledge of the connections 
between ﬁnancing and delivery systems, including an understanding of 
how consolidation among providers might affect the desired outcomes. 
Connections between the commercial ﬁnancing and provider systems and 
the analogous public systems must also be evaluated, and we must assess 
how the availability of charity care will affect the behavior of key players. 
Finally, as information systems evolve, new beneﬁt design packages that 
combine the traits of integrated delivery systems and ﬁnancial incentives 
for patients and providers will become more commonplace. If we can 
develop a system that encourages adoption of value-promoting beneﬁt 
packages, which is the essence of what Dr. Enthoven proposes, we will at 
least be moving in the right direction. 
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